DATA MINING PRACA
NASA developed the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) system during the Space Shuttle Program "to establish a process to continuously improve safety and reliability" [1] . The elements of the PRACA database were to have immediate visibility into problems and establish a historic database. The NASA PRACA database closely emulates the Department of Defense (DOD) Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) [2] . The PRACA database provided a method for NASA to have a closed loop failure reporting system to support trend analysis, document system failure history, support anomaly investigation, and document corrective actions.
Failure Reporting and the Problem Reporting System
The PRACA database documented problems within all aspects of the Space Shuttle Program from hardware, software, Ground Support Equipment (GSE), and launch & landing facilities. The PRACA database was applicable to all elements of the Space Shuttle Program including contractors, subcontractors, and vendors. The PRACA database was managed by the NASA Office of and Mission Assurance (OSMA) and was therefore primarily focused on system safety.
The creation, content, and applicability of the PRACA database records became the responsibility of the system engineers, field engineers, and the logistic engineers. The system engineer created the PRACA database record originally as a hardcopy document and eventually entered the record into the Web-based Program Compliance Assurance and Status System (WEBPCASS). The WEBPCASS system documented all phases of the non-conformance reporting cycle (see Figure 1 ). 
The Problem with PRACA
As the PRACA database evolved it became a very large and complex database. Each different element of the SSP required different reports or had different reporting needs. Such as, the Orbiter elements required different reports for anomalies that occurred inflight and during orbiter processing. To accommodate reporting, different codes were periodically established within the PRACA database. The periodic addition of anomaly codes was requested by the elements to track different types of anomalies. The addition of a continuous changing code structure not relative to all elements resulted in a very complex database structure.
The PRACA database is a context-and-technology specific knowledge database. In reporting how the anomaly occurs during the problem detection phase, the PRACA database allowed for collection of context-specific knowledge of system failure. In the remaining non-conformance phases (see Figure 1 ) technology-specific knowledge of components and software was collected in the PRACA database. [3] The PRACA database focused on the capture of knowledge and collection of specific details relevant to individual component or software for the system. The technological specific knowledge of the individual component (or like component) provides the basis to develop component level operational probabilities of failure. The PRACA database, due to the requirement to collect component anomaly data, contains the technological specific details.
The PRACA database is a collection of information that becomes knowledge when the individual users of the system utilize the data to make informed decisions. Internal system engineering users could derive information from the collection of the data in PRACA, but, most external users could not unless they had knowledge of what they were looking for. [4] This paper proposes a methodology that can be used by external sources to derive technology knowledge when researching large databases that, during the collection of the data, were focused on system operation. Figure 2 identifies how the PRACA database documented, arranged, and conveyed information to the various engineering groups. The context of knowledge management, the PRACA database focused on the capture of the information dealing with nonconformance. The capture of detailed information on what systems were impacted by a problem became the major focus of the PRACA database. After identification of the individual system in which a problem existed, system engineering and technician teams sought to correct the problem. The capture of this information was the central core of the PRACA database.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATA REPORT

Figure 2: PRACA Knowledge Management
The second layer of the PRACA database was to catalog the actions of the teams in the correction of the nonconformance problems. The PRACA database was cataloged by the use of codes. The source for determination of which code to use was the text that was written by various individual engineers, lead technicians, and quality personnel. The text written explained the problem and the corrective action.
The third layer of the PRACA database was to communicate the information to SM&A and engineering groups that utilized the information on a daily basis to manage the operation of the Space Shuttle Program.
The transformation of context knowledge --known only to specific system engineers --to the technical knowledge that can be utilized by various industries and internally within NASA, can be performed through the use of practical component analysis tools. [5] The remainder of this paper will focus on the nature of component failure.
The two aspects of component failure to examine in the data are:
• How the component performed in general?
• How the component performed during critical operations?
PRACA Fields Defined
The first area to define in researching the PRACA database is the element in which the Space Shuttle Program data analysis is to occur. Since these data are context-andtechnology specific, the data fields recorded were specific for the different elements. The different Space Shuttle elements primarily communicated the information to specific NASA centers that were responsible for the performance of the element.
The PRACA database for the Space Shuttle hardware element which included the orbiter, government furnished equipment, flight crew equipment, Space Shuttle main engine, external tank, solid rocket rooster, reusable solid rocket motor, and cargo integration hardware.
The Space Shuttle software element included orbiter software discrepancies, Space Shuttle main engine software discrepancies, launch processing system, and the support hardware used to operate the systems.
In order to catalog data by system, within the PRACA database an organized set of program model numbers was used to identify the separate systems at the Kennedy Space Center. The remainder of this paper will focus on the KSC PRACA database.
Kennedy Space Center Program Model Number
The program model number used at the Kennedy Space Center was used to identify the system, equipment item, and the location used. The program model number further identified the responsible engineering group required to provide support for the operation and configuration of the respective system.
The structure of the Kennedy Space Center program model number consisted of an alphanumeric code that cataloged the PRACA database by system. The first letter categorized the general equipment item classification defined by the program (i.e., Mechanical, Electrical, etc.). The second code identified the flight element supported by the equipment. The third sequence of numbers identifies sequentially the system. The final series of numbers would identify the specific equipment code within the system.
The program model number code is used to pull the data from the PRACA database for a specific system. Ad hoc data searches within the PRACA database or any large database can produce thousands of records and fields. In order to understand the data results the user must invoke a given set of stipulations.
Hierarchical Approach to Define the Report
The heuristic approach to defining the data into a collection of data is needed to understand and catalog the system information into component knowledge. The hierarchical approach aids to further render the information into usable data.
For example: The PRACA database (or any large database) search begins with treating the data with a first level qualifier. In the case of the PRACA database this is the program model number.
Figure 3: Hierarchical Approach to Data
The second level of hierarchy catalogs the data by assembly type or functional area of the system. It is helpful to subdivide the system into functional areas that are required for the entire system to operate. The second level of the system may or may not be readily available in the database. The functional area of the system is a collection of components. By identifying the functional area the system probabilities calculations can identify key areas which are having a significant impact to the overall operation of the system.
The third level hierarchy is the component itself. Often the component may be identified in a common term such as valve, breaker, switch, or it may be identified as a reference designator for the system. If the system utilizes reference designators then the coding of the terms will need to be available.
Most Computer Maintenance Management Systems (CMMS) use a specific numeric identifier to specify the component. [6] The component may be called a part or equipment depending on the CMMS used. In a modern CMMS the numeric identifier can be a great help in establishing the pedigree of the component.
Additional key fields to have in the report are:
• Work order or tracking number of the record • Description of the problem • Location of the problem
Heuristic Selection of Valid Data
In large database applications like the PRACA database, where many users capture data, cataloging of the data is needed and performed by codes. The PRACA database utilized a cause code method to catalog the nonconformance reason. The problem is that many times the cause codes were used randomly and did not truly identify the problem.
The only true method for determining the characteristic that the user is trying to research and gain knowledge of is to read each record's description. The number of records obtained in an ad hoc search may be in the thousands and reading through each record is an arduous task. There are software tools available that can assist to detect inconsistent data.
To assist in the cataloging of the files a heuristic was created that identifies specific issues and assists in correction of the data. Examples of items in the PRACA heuristic are:
• Identify component reference designators from system drawing.
• Eliminate duplicate records.
• Disregard labeling or cosmetic problems.
• Disregard structural corrosion problems.
• Disregard nonconformance problems written to areas not involved in the research.
• Disregard out-of-calibration problems.
• Accept repairs made during calibration.
• Disregard unknown source or blank field.
• Disregard spare part discrepancies.
• Disregard workmanship or procedural errors.
• Disregard abandoned-in-place equipment.
• Disregard portable equipment nonconformance.
• Disregard nonconformance written against other systems.
• Disregard data that occurs outside of the timeframe under research. The above listing can be modified depending on the knowledge needed to be gained from the data.
In a recent study the raw data report generated 3,338 records. After reading through each record then classifying the individual records by the research objective in a hierarchal and heuristic method the data that was subjected to further analysis were 313.
Failure-Intensity Analysis
Once the PRACA data has been reviewed to remove nonrelevant data files, these data can be communicated by identifying the failure intensity of the individual assemblies of the system. [7] Failure intensity (FI) is defined as:
Assumption #2: The number of assemblies or component failures (n) occurs during the period of the PRACA investigation.
Assumption #3: The assemblies within the system are subjected to the same time of exposure.
In the example used for this paper the resultant FI chart would reflect the number of times the assembly failed during operation.
The FI analysis aids in focusing on the major contributors to the system failure. As indicated by Figure 4 the major contributors would be in assemblies 1-7.
Figure 4: Assembly Failure Intensity
This allows the remaining analysis to focus on the components within assemblies that at least have a greater than 5% contribution to the system failure.
The component FI can be analyzed in the same manner. In the examination of Assembly-1 the collection of components were cataloged to identify the greatest contributor. Figure 5 identifies that valves have the greatest contribution to failure of Assembly-1.
Figure 5: Component Failure Intensity 3 REPAIRABLE SYSTEM RELIABILITY
System reliability is directly related to the capability of the various assemblies to operate successfully without a nonconformance (i.e., failure). The Crow-AMSAA model provides a statistical analysis model that can be utilized to understand or determine the failure rate of the various system assemblies. The advantage of using the Crow-AMSAA model is its capability to handle data that may be incomplete or have various problems. The Crow-AMSAA model has been determined to work well with databases like PRACA for identifying and tracking failure events. The Crow-AMSAA model was identified by the U.S. Air Force as the best growth model to use. [8] The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) refers to the Crow-AMSAA model as the Power Law Model. The cumulative failure or expected number of failures E [N(t)] at a test time is computed by parameters λ and β; where λ is the scale parameter and β is the shape parameter. [9] (2) Assumption #1: The scale parameter λ and shape parameter β are for a repairable subsystem, assembly, or component.
Assumption #2: The failures identified occur along a Weibull distribution due to burn out, wear out, and useful life.
Rate of Occurrence of Failure (ROCOF)
The instantaneous function p(t) is used to measure the instantaneous failure rate at each cumulative failure point and can be evaluated as the Rate of Occurrence of Failure (ROCOF). The calculation of the instantaneous function can be made by the following: p t λβt (3) The data table developed from the cataloging of the PRACA data time of occurrence is determined by the problem detection date or report date. It is important that the data be cataloged on a sequential base from the first identified problem to last report date. This would identify the data analysis to be following a Nonhomogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP). [10] When reviewing the data most of the time it will be found that the data may not have a constant variance between the individual ROCOF points. In order to compensate for data variance the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) estimation method is used to estimate the shape parameter β.
Where N is the total number of failures (relevant failures) to the k (number of items) ROCOF event, T j is the end observation (Total relevant operating time for the j th item) and t i is the accumulated relevant operating time. The maximum likelihood estimate is the value of β that satisfies equation (4).
DISTRIBUTION FIT
For the example demonstrated in this paper a Crow-AMSAA Weibull analysis software module from "The New Weibull Handbook" by Robert Abernethy [8] was used to calculate the assembly failure intensity and the subsequent failure data.
Using the PRACA sample data example Figure 6 indicates the accumulated number of failures for the operating hours of the system. These data were obtained from the PRACA data summarized in Figure 4 .
Figure 6: Example Accumulated Failures
The Crow-AMSAA plot developed with the interval data from the accumulated number of failures and the interval time identifies the cumulative scale parameter λ and slope β in a log-log plot is identified in Figure 7 . An interval data assumption is used due to the demand type of application and use of the system. The PRACA database documents the failures during the interval that the system is used. The results of the PRACA search are thus used to estimate cumulative scale parameter λ for the example data set is 0.06802 with a slope β of 0.973. Since the slope is less than 1 (β<1) the system failure distribution can be assumed to be a non-homogenous poisson process, with the failures coming more slowly as repairs are made to the system.
CONCLUSION
The mining of data from sources such as the NASA PRACA database can be a complex and tedious effort unless a clear understanding of the knowledge effort is defined. A heuristic approach to the categorizing of these data allow for consistent results when necessary to identify credible failures at the assembly or component level. The use of a Crow-AMSAA analysis can aid in the understanding of failure rate data when the data is continuous and the operating hours are known. There are other proven methods of treatment of data. The application of the treatment to the data to gain knowledge is determined by how the information was obtained as well as the known operational characteristics. The use of a structured approach can change a collection of data files into useful knowledge.
